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Aside from the Oxenfeldt and Kelly resource constraint argument, the franchising litera- 
ture offers mostly arguments centering on incentive issues to explain the existence and use 
of franchise contracts.’ Both the transaction costs approach and principal-agent theory have 
emphasized the role of franchisee incentives, though the need to give incentives to frm- 
chisurs and the effect this has on the design and use of franchise contracts also have been 
discussed (e.g., Rubin 1978; Mathewson and Winter 1985; Lal 1990; and Bhattacharyya and 
Lafontaine 1992). As noted by Bergen, Dutta and Walker (1992), the literature emphasizing 
incentives has been mostly static, and has had little to say about the dynamics of the ownership 
mix. Nevertheless, as in the Oxenfeldt and Kelly argument, it is possible to borrow from static 
theory in order to preform the analysis of franchise system evolution. In other words, if the 
antecedent factors predictive of franchising change as the system matures, theory would predict 
changes in the decision to franchise units or operate them as company-owned outlets. 
In this paper, we exploit the way in which these antecedent factors are likely to change as 
a franchised system matures to suggest testable competing hypotheses derived from both the 
resource constraint and incentive-based explanations for franchising. We show how these 
two approaches lead to different predictions as to the expected movement of the ownership 
mix (i.e., the proportion of company-owned and franchised units in the overall system) as a 
system matures. We then proceed to test these hypotheses using primary survey data. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the theoretical perspec- 
tives in more detail and derive our hypotheses. We then briefly summarize the existing 
empirical evidence relating to these hypotheses. Next, we report and discuss the results of 
our study of 130 franchising companies. The last section contains concluding remarks. 
It should be noted from the outset that we are not speaking here about the general evolution 
of franchising as an industry or as an organizational form. Rather, our focus is on how the 
structure of individual franchise systems (as super-organizations) evolve as they move from 
the initial stages of their life cycle to maturity. 
OWNERSHIP PATTERNS AND SYSTEM EVOLUTION 
Why retailers franchise outlets rather than owning and operating them directly has been a 
central question in the franchising literature. According to existing theories, the reasons for 
choosing to franchise fall into two main categories: (1) resource constraints; and (2) incentive 
issues. Here, we examine the basic arguments relating these factors to the use of franchising, and 
derive predictions as to how changes in these over time are likely to impact franchisers’ choices. 
Resource Constraints 
The resource constraint argument, first put forward by Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969), holds 
that franchisers use franchising to obtain access to some resources that franchisees own. 
Oxenfeldt and Kelly suggested that the resource provided by franchisees may be financial 
capital, human capital, or managerial talent. Similarly, Norton (1988) emphasized the 
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franchiser’s need for human capital and managerial talent as a reason for franchising, while 
Minkler (1990) focused on the franchisee’s capacity to provide local market expertise. 
Underlying this resource constraint argument is the assumption that retailers prefer to own 
their outlets; it is only because that option is unavailable to them that they choose to franchise. 
If we assume such a preference, for argument sake, (an assumption we relax below), the next 
step is to determine if and when such ownership is possible. New niche retailers with unique 
concepts often find market preemption and rapid expansion to be key components of their 
marketing strategy (Gilman 1990). But rapid growth requires significant increases in human 
and financial capital, as well as expertise in unfamiliar markets, resources to which a young 
organization may not have easy access. 
As noted by Norton (1988), franchising is one way for such firms to gain access to these 
resources. For example, while managers with the talent to operate new outlets are often 
difficult to develop from within, especially early in an organization’s history, franchisees 
often provide ready sources of such human capital. Franchisees, typically drawn from the 
markets into which the chain intends to expand, also provide important real estate and 
demand expertise otherwise unavailable to the retailer (Bush, Tatham and Hair 1976; 
Minkler 1990). Moreover, new retail chains may be unable to generate enough cash 
internally to expand at the desired rate. Selling franchises is a way to obtain more expansion 
capital. Not only do the franchise fees generate cash that the franchiser needs to create the 
supporting infra-structure for the growing system, but the franchisees also typically provide 
the fixed investment for equipment, signage, and often, buildings and land. It is clear that 
franchisers perceive growth as an important reason for franchising as indicated by survey 
research (Lafontaine 1992b; Dant 1994). 
Rubin (1978) has argued that, because of differences in risk, selling shares in the whole 
chain is a more efficient solution to the capital problem than franchising which, in reality, 
amounts to selling shares in individual outlets. Thus he notes that the shortage of financial 
capital experienced by a new chain should not cause the retailer to franchise its outlets, but 
rather to raise funds from investors. In his view, if a firm decides to franchise, it does so 
because of reasons other than access to capital. 
Examining Rubin’s (1978) argument, Lafontaine (1992a) pointed out that franchising may 
be a less expensive source of capital if there are incentive issues at the outlet level. She argues 
that if managers lack incentives to exert effort, investors with a portfolio of shares from all 
outlets are likely to demand higher rates of return, even if their investment is less risky, than 
they would on the capital invested in a single store that they manage themselves. Hence, 
capital may after all be more efficiently obtained from franchisees than from investors. 
Not included in Ruhin’s or Lafontaine’s analysis is the value the entrepreneur-retailer may 
place on maintaining personal and “unencumbered control” over the strategic direction of 
his or her organization. Combined with the fact that in new chains the shares sold are likely 
to be held by a few large shareholders, control over the operations of widely dispersed and 
relatively small franchisees may be more easy to maintain than control over corporate 
strategy in a boardroom inhabited by heavily invested venture capitalists. Initially, therefore, 
when capital is scarce, retailers might opt for franchising even if that source of capital is 
ostensibly somewhat more costly. 
Whether franchising is initially the most efficient source of capital or not, as the system 
matures, the financial and human capital constraints are gradually relaxed. When this occurs, 
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the resource constraints argument predicts that the proportion of company-owned outlets 
will increase as the franchiser moves toward a completely company-owned chain. Only the 
marginal outlets, e.g., those located far from company headquarters, or those facing low 
demand, will remain in the hands of franchisees. Although new outlets will be opened as 
company-owned units from the outset, changes in the ownership of existing outlets may be 
slowed by lengthy franchise agreements and the difficulty in negotiating reacquisitions prior 
to expiration. These lag effects, therefore, should lead franchisers to perceive their desired 
proportion of company-owned outlets (i.e., that proportion they view as optimal for their 
system) typically to exceed the current mix. 
The resource constraint argument, therefore, leads to the following set of testable impli- 
cations: 
HlA: The proportion of company-owned stores desired byfranchisors should 
be quite high, approaching 100%. 
H2A: The proportion of company-owned stores should increase with the age 
of the franchiser.’ 
H3A: The desired proportion of company-owned stores should never be 
below the current proportion. 
H2A and H3A are derived here under the assumption that early in its history the firm does 
not have good access to financial or human capital from sources other than franchisees. Large 
parent corporations, to which some franchise systems belong, are a potential alternative 
source of these resources. As a result, H2A and H3A need not hold for franchisers that are 
subsidiaries of larger corporations. If these firms have better access to resources, or are not 
as constrained as other new franchisers are, we should find that: 
H4A: The proportion of company-owned stores is greaterforfranchisors that 
are subsidiaries of large corporations than for non-subsidiary fran- 
chisors of similar age. 
Incentives 
Another general set of explanations for franchising, emphasized in both the transaction 
costs and the principal-agent literature, has been based on the need to motivate the franchisee 
(or the franchisee and the franchiser) to exert the proper amount of effort to make the business 
a success (Williamson 1985; Rubin 1978; Mathewson and Winter 1985). By giving the 
franchisee a claim to a large part of the profits of the outlet, the franchiser is assured that the 
franchisee will want to put in the rigRt amount of effort in managing the store (see e.g., Caves 
and Murphy 1976; Mathewson and Winter 1985; Brickley and Dark 1987; Norton 1988; 
Lafontaine 1992a; and Sen 1993).3 By also including in the contract a variable payment to 
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the franchiser, (i.e., royalties) based on outlet sales, the franchisee is assured that the 
franchiser also has incentives to put sufficient effort into the management of the overall 
system (Rubin 1978; Muris 1981; Blair and Kaserman 1982; Mathewson and Winter 1985; 
La1 1990; Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine 1992). In other words, this line of reasoning attacks 
the underlying assumption of the resource constraint argument by suggesting that the 
alignment of franchiser and franchisee interests attained through the franchise agreement 
produces a more efficient operation than could be achieved through vertical integration and 
internal control. 
Incentive-based arguments, therefore, suggest that franchising should be the preferred 
organizational form throughout the life of a retail chain: the chain would start with a limited 
number of prototype company-owned units and move basically toward a fully franchised 
chain (Martin 1988).4 As before, because of the time it takes to effect changes in ownership, 
this shift toward franchising would take some time, leading to the observation of a lag effect. 
In summary, incentive-based explanations for franchising lead to exactly the opposite 
implications from those obtained in first three hypotheses described in the previous section. 
HlB: Theproportion of company-owned stores desired byfranchisors should 
be quite low, approaching 0%. 
H2B: The proportion of company-owned stores should decrease with the age 
of the franchisor.5 
H3B: The desiredproportion of company-owned stores should never be above 
the current proportion. 
Moreover, because the incentive arguments for franchising are unrelated to capital 
constraints, whether a franchiser has access to capital through a larger parent corporation or 
not is irrelevant to the franchising decision. Thus, 
H4B: The proportion of company-owned stores should be unrelated to 
whether the franchiser is the subsidiary of a larger corporation. 
Stable Benefits of Mixed Ownership 
As indicated above, the resource constraint argument for franchising assumes that com- 
pany-ownership is the preferred method of operation. The incentive argument suggests that 
franchising should be the preferred method. In a unique approach to this question, Bradach 
and Eccles (1989) incorporate the concept of tapered integration from economics to argue 
that firms often strategically employ “plural forms” of organization, i.e., they combine the 
use of price, authority and trust-based governance mechanisms to organize their exchange 
relationships. Applying this idea to franchise systems, Bradach and Eccles suggest that 
franchise systems employ dual distribution not only because some individual outlets are best 
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suited for one form and some for the other, but also because the existence of each form 
positively impacts the management of the other side of the business (see also Harris and 
Wiens 1980 for a similar argument applied to public and private enterprises). For example, 
having company owned outlets provides first hand operational insight and credibility that 
can be used to better manage the franchised outlets. Similarly, having franchised units 
provides innovative ideas and reality checks on decisions that might remain unchallenged 
under the authority based management of company-owned chains (see Dant et al. 1992 for 
a list of benefits of dual distribution specific to franchise systems). 
Bradach and Eccles do not include a dynamic process in their analysis of the benefits of 
the “plural form” in franchise systems. It is clear, however, that many of the suggested 
benefits are the product of organizational groping for optimal operations, relationships and 
strategies (Mintzberg 1987). Unlike the financial or incentive based determinants of owner- 
ship structure which are apparent ex ante, therefore, the system-specific managerial value of 
a mix of both company owned and franchised units may be learned over time. Consistent 
with this argument, Lillis, Narayana and Gilman (1976) found that the advantages of 
franchising that franchisers identified early in a franchise system’s life cycle, such as capital 
availability, risk sharing, market penetration and even to a lesser extent franchisee motiva- 
tion, began to diminish as the system reached late maturity. The benefits of a mixed 
ownership structure, learned through the ongoing management of the system, may act to 
balance the decreasing importance of the more obvious direct benefits of franchising. If so, 
these learned synergistic managerial benefits may act to dampen movement toward either 
full ownership or fully franchised systems. A dynamic learning model of dual distribution 
in franchised systems, therefore, suggests the following: 
H5: The salience of the synergistic managerial benefits provided by the 
company ownership of outlets will increase with the age of the fran- 
chisor. 
H6: The salience of the synergistic managerial effects provided by franchi- 
see ownership of outlets will increase with the age of the franchiser. 
EXISTING EVIDENCE 
A number of studies have examined changes in ownership patterns in franchising using the 
aggregate industry level data published for the years 1972-1986 by the Department of 
Commerce (U.S. Department of Commerce 1988; see Dant et al. 1992 for a review of the 
empirical evidence on ownership patterns). But the existing empirical evidence at the firm 
level, the appropriate level of analysis to really address the Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969) 
hypothesis, remains quite sparse. To our knowledge, only Ozanne and Hunt (197 l), Hunt 
(1972), Lillis et al. (1976), Martin (1988), Carney and Gedajlovic (1991) and Lafontaine 
(1992a, b) have examined the contractual mix of individual franchisers. Using cross sectional 
data, these researchers relied on the comparison of the proportion of company-owned units 
between old and new franchised businesses at a particular point in time to assess the effect 
The Evolution of Ownership Patterns in Franchise Systems 103 
of franchiser maturity on the ownership mix. Yet, the Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969) hypothesis 
describes how ownership patterns evolve for a given firm as it goes from start-up to maturity. 
Unfortunately, at this point, the longitudinal data on franchisers’ ownership mix that would 
be most appropriate to test dynamic propositions such as the Oxenfeldt and Kelly hypothesis, 
remain unavailable. 
An alternative strategy, which we follow in this paper, is to use a survey to obtain both 
cross-sectional and historical information directly from franchisers. The drawbacks associ- 
ated with this type of data, based on respondent hindsight, are well known (see Fischoff 
1975). Still, we believe that this approach yields the best data yet available to analyze the 
dynamics of ownership patterns. In that sense, we present our results as a first step towards 
an increased understanding of individual firm dynamics. 
THE STUDY 
The Sample 
The sampling frame employed in this study was the membership of the International 
Franchise Association (IFA). The IFA is the main cross-industry trade association for the 
franchise industry, and it represents the entire spectrum of franchising companies in the 
United States and (to a lesser extent) abroad. A total of 603 questionnaires were mailed to 
the founders or current presidents of U.S. franchise systems. Of these, 5 were returned by 
the post office as undeliverable, and 15 respondents identified themselves as non-fianchisors, 
i.e., franchise consultants, companies providing services to franchisers, or firms no longer 
involved in franchising. One hundred and thirty usable questionnaires were returned. The 
response rate, based on questionnaires reaching potential respondents, was 22%. 
To examine the representativeness of the sample, the respondents were compared to the 
population of franchising companies reported in Franchising in the Economy (IFA and 
Horwath International 1990).6 The average business format franchise company in 1988 (the 
last date for which there is published data available) had 150 units, with 3% of the companies 
having over 1000 units. In our sample, the average franchiser had 3 15 units, and eight percent 
of the respondents had over 1000 units, reflecting a high response rate from large companies. 
One reason for this upward bias is that the membership list of the IFA reflects a dispropor- 
tionate number of the well-known, leading franchise companies. This bias suggests that the 
results of our study may not be generalizable to small franchise systems. However, given 
our emphasis on evolution, it is important that our sample reflect systems large enough to 
have begun to experience some relaxation of resource constraints. 
The respondents were also compared to the population in terms of the specific industries 
to which they belong. Table 1 reports the industry breakdown of the sample and the 
population. The sample appears to fairly represent the population on this criterion.7 
The sample also closely reflects the recent rapid growth of franchising and the youth of 
many franchise systems. From data published in Franchising in the Economy, we know that 
between 1980 and 1986 approximately 1500 new franchise systems were created. This 
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TABLE 1 
Distribution of Respondents According to 
their Type of Business 
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represented 68% of the franchisers reported to be doing business in 1986. In our sample, 
sixty percent of the responding franchisers had become involved in franchising in the 1980s. 
Perhaps most importantly, the sample closely matches the population in terms of the 
percentage of company-owned outlets. The population percentage in 1988 was reported as 
2 1.6% (IFA and Horwath International 1990), while the mean percentage in our sample was 
17.8%. The difference between these two means is not significant. 
Measures 
The survey instrument contained both structured and open-ended questions. Some of the 
questions permitted multiple answers. For example, respondents were asked to enumerate 
the advantages of franchising or owning outlets directly. The answers to these open-ended 
questions were content analyzed and grouped to capture meaningful constructs while 
maintaining as much of the rich diversity of the responses as possible. It is important to note, 
however, that the open-ended question format for some of the measures, though helpful in 
uncovering unanticipated responses, is influenced heavily by the interest and cooperative- 
ness of the respondents. Fortunately, the high percentage of fully usable questionnaires offers 
some evidence that this may not have been a serious issue in this study. 
Respondents were asked to state their current proportion of company-owned outlets and 
the proportion that they would like to have in their system (expressed as ranges, see Table 
2). These self-reported measures were then supplemented with published data specific to the 
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respondent franchisers (Bond and Bond 1991; U.S. Department of Commerce 1991; Entre- 
preneur 1991; Info Press, Inc. 1991). Measures of the salience of the synergistic managerial 
benefits of company and franchisee ownership were obtained through open-ended questions 
asking franchisers what they perceived to be the advantages and disadvantages of franchised 
and company-owned units (see bottom of Table 3 for the exact questions used). A dummy 
variable was created for each category of benefits by assigning a value of one to respondents 
who mentioned the category and zero to those who did not. 
Finally, franchisers were asked in the survey to indicate when they started franchising. 
This information was used to generate our age variable which we use as a surrogate for the 
degree of system maturity and thus as a measure of a franchiser’s greater access to resources 
(Lillis et al. 1976). Finally, information as to whether the franchise system is a subsidiary of 
a larger corporation was also obtained directly from the respondents. 
Results 
HlA and HlB and H3A and H3B were tested by examining the self-reported desired 
proportion of company-owned outlets, and then comparing it with the current proportion 
(see Table 2). No respondent signified that they would like to own and operate 100% of their 
outlets, and only two franchisers indicated a preference for owning the majority of their units 
(Table 2). About one third of the respondents said they would prefer to own none, or less 
than 5% of all the units, with twenty-three percent of the franchisers indicated that they 
would prefer a fully franchised system. The relatively small desired proportions of company- 
owned units suggests that franchising is preferred as the dominant mode of operation for 
these firms. This finding is consistent with the incentive argument for franchising, and calls 
into question the assumed preference for company-ownership inherent in the resource 
constraint argument. On the other hand, the fact that more than 75% of the franchisers want 
TABLE 2 
Comparison of Desired and Actual Proportions of Company Owned Outlets 
Desired Actual 
0% 7-5% 6-10% 11-20% 21-50% 51%+ No ans. Total 
0% ia 4 0 1 0 0 0 23 
l-5% 6 25 2 3 3 3 0 42 
6-10% 4 5 6 4 4 1 0 24 
ll-20% 2 1 2 2 1 2 0 10 
21-50% 1 1 3 0 13 7 0 2s 
Sl-99% 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 3 
100% 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
No ans. 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Total 32 36 13 10 22 16 1 130 
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TABLE 3 
Synergistic Effects of Dual Distribution 
1. Effects of Franchised Units on the Management of Company-Owned Units (36% of the respondents 
mentioned one or both of these benefits) 
Franchisees as Sources of New Ideas (20%) 
Franchisees as Sources of Objective Input on Franchiser Policies (20%) 
2. Effects of Company-Owned Units on Management of Franchised Units (75% of the respondents 
mentioned one or more of the following) 
Company-Owned Units as Platforms for Research and Development of Products, Services and Train- 
ing (64%) 
Company-Owned Units as Sources of Market Information (27%) 
Company-Owned Units as Sources of Credibility among Franchisees (13%) 
Company-Owned Units as Platforms for Development of Standards and Policies (7%) 
Company-Owned Units as Source of Common Bond with Franchisees (2%) 
Notes: The open-ended survey questions used to determine the salience of these synergistic effects for the respondents 
were: 
7. Most franchisers have both franchisedand company-ownedoutlets. Why don’t they franchise a// their units 
or operate them all? 
2. What advantages might company-operated outlets have in a franchised chain? 
3. What advantages do franchised outlets have? 
4. What do franchisees provide your organization that company store managers do not? 
to operate some units directly suggests that there are some benefits to company-ownership 
that the incentive-based explanations for franchising do not capture. 
Comparing the self-reported desired proportion and the actual proportion of company- 
owned units, more than half of the respondents (sixty-six) chose the same range for both (see 
diagonal in Table 2). The remaining respondents were arrayed both above and below the 
diagonal, with no dominant pattern. Thirty-five franchisers (27%) said they were operating 
above their perceived optimal, while 27 (21%) said they were operating below it. Separating 
the groups on the basis of their status as a subsidiary or not leads to similar results. Overall, 
these results provide little support for HlA or HlB (though the data are somewhat more 
consistent with the latter), or for either lag hypothesis, H3A or H3B. 
To examine H2A, H2B and H4A, H4B, the parameters of the following equation were 
estimated: 
% Company owned = bc~ +fitAGE + P2(l/AGE) + P3SUB + Pd(AGE x SUB) (1) 
The combination of AGE and (l/AGE) in the equation allows for the possibility of a 
nonlinear relationship of a form that is most consistent with the pattern one should observe 
if resource constraints were an important determinant of ownership. (We also tried the 
exponential functional form, but the chosen form fit the theory and data better, and is more 
easily interpreted.) The results of the regression are reported in Table 4. The positive 
regression coefficients for both l/AGE and AGE, and their relative sizes, indicate an initial 
inverse relationship between the proportion of company-owned outlets and the age of the 
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TABLE 4 
Regression Results: Proportion of Company-Owned Outlets 
as Dependent Variable 
Adjusted R-Square:.22 
F = 9.75 Sig. of F = .OO 
n=122 
Variable B T Sig. T 
AGEa .007 2.11 .037 
l/AGE .491 5.20 .ooo 
SUBb ,187 2.90 .004 
lNTERACTC -.007 -1.68 .095 
(Constant) -.065 -1.12 ,264 
Notes: aACE is defined as the total number of years the franchiser has been in business. 
b 
SUB is a dummy variable where it equals 1 if the franchiser is a subsidiary of a 
larger corporation. 
‘INTERACT is an AGE by SUB interaction term. 
system, a relationship that then turns upward after about 16 years. The positive coefficient 
for SUB shows that the status of subsidiary is predictive of a greater proportion of 
company-owned outlets. However, the nonsignificant interaction term implies that the slope 
of the relationship between age and company ownership does not change due to subsidiary 
status. Combined, these findings provide some support for the resource constraint arguments 
as reflected in H2A, and H4A. 
Our survey also provided firm by firm data on how the proportion of company-owned 
units changed since the system first began franchising.* This allowed us to examine the 
validity of H2A and H2B from a somewhat different perspective, namely from self-reported 
historical data. Interestingly, only 76 out of the 130 respondents reported a change in the 
proportion of company-owned units. (It is likely that some of the other 54 respondents meant 
either that the proportion had not changed much or that the number of company-owned units 
had not changed. These answers illustrate well some of the difficulties inherent in obtaining 
self-reported data based on hindsight.) Of those who indicated that this proportion had 
changed, more than half (40 of 76) said that it had decreased over the franchising life of the 
company. Another 15 (20%) said that it had increased, while 14 franchisers said that it had 
varied with no clear pattern. Only one respondent said that it went down and then up, the 
pattern one would expect to find if franchisers first develop prototype company-owned units, 
then use franchising to get access to resources to expand, and finally reduce their reliance 
on franchising as their resource constraints become more relaxed. 
Turning to Bradach and Eccles’ (1988) notion that there might be synergistic benefits 
derived from having both company-owned and franchised units in the same system, the data 
in Table 2 are supportive of this idea in that they show that most franchisers desire a mix of 
both company-owned and franchised units. The respondents’ focus, however, seems to be 
on the way that the presence of company-owned units in the system can assist in the 
successful management of the franchised units. While only 36% of the franchisers mentioned 
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TABLE 5 
Relationship of System Age to Advantages of Dual Distribution 
Mean Age Std. D. t-vat Sig. 
A. H5: 





Yes 9.6 9.3 
(n=96) 
6. H6: 
Mentioned Synergy Effect of 9.0 9.0 
Franchised Outlets k=Hb, 
2.02 ,029 
(df=64) 
Yes 13.2 12.0 
(n=46) 
the positive impact of franchised outlets on the company-owned side of the business, 75% 
mentioned the positive impact of company-owned outlets on the management of the 
franchised side. 
H5 and H6 were tested directly by comparing the mean age of the group of respondents 
that recognized the synergistic benefits of company-owned and franchised outlets with the 
mean age of those that did not. Results from that comparison are shown in Table 5. The mean 
age of the group that mentioned synergistic benefits from some company ownership was 
somewhat lower (significant at the .l level), than the group that didn’t (H5). At the same 
time, the age of the group that mentioned synergistic benefits from some franchisee 
ownership was significantly greater on average than the age of the group that didn’t (H6). 
These results suggest that the synergistic benefits of company-owned units become apparent 
earlier in a system’s history, while the synergistic effects of franchisee-owned units are 
recognized only later in a franchiser’s life cycle. 
RELATED FINDINGS 
Although the ownership mix is perhaps the single most important feature of franchised 
systems (or the one that has generated the most research), other critical components of the 
franchiser-franchisee relationship are the sets of rights and obligations that define the 
governance of the system. Modern business practice has tended to minimize the centrality 
of formal contract (Macaulay 1963). However, in franchising the formal agreement is a vital 
and highly specific document (see, for example, Udell 1972; Noordewier 1991). By 
reference, the agreement also often incorporates lengthy operations manuals with rigid 
standards of quality and performance through which the franchiser can provide new, 
inexperienced franchisees with a guide to the best practice available (Kaufmann and 
Leibenstein 1988). Our survey yielded some useful information relative to the way in which 
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various components of the franchise contract evolve as the franchiser’s system matures. We 
now turn to a brief description of those results. 
Managing uniform quality within a franchise system tends to require some degree of 
uniformity across franchise agreements. Prior empirical work has revealed that franchise 
contracts are often “contracts of adhesion rather than balanced, negotiated agreements” 
(Hunt 1972). Our findings are generally consistent with this statement. Ninety-seven percent 
of the respondents to the survey said that they offered the same standard franchise contract 
to all their potential franchisees at a given point in time. Moreover, forty-four percent of the 
respondents indicated that the contracts they offered to franchisees were on a take-it-or- 
leave-it basis, leaving no room whatsoever for negotiation. Where some room was left for 
negotiation, it was not allowed with respect to monetary terms, such as royalty rates and 
franchise fees, but focused instead on non-monetary terms? The franchisers allowing such 
negotiation were significantly younger than those that did not. Apparently, franchisers are 
more willing to permit diversity of obligations early in their systems’ development than after 
they have gained experience and the concept has solidified. 
Although there was much uniformity in the franchise fees and royalty rates offered to 
franchisees at a given point in time, these fees did change as the systems matured. Seventy- 
one percent of the responding franchisers reported having modified their franchise fees at 
least once during the life of their system, and 52% reported having changed their royalty 
rates. Viewed from another perspective, however, these results suggest a fairly high degree 
of stability. Twenty-nine percent of the respondents say that their franchise fee has never 
been modified since they first became involved in franchising (not even to keep up with 
inflation), and 48% have never changed their royalty rate. It should be noted, however, that 
almost all (89%) of those franchise systems with no change in their franchise fees had become 
involved in franchising in the 1980s. 
Respondents reported that adjustments to their franchise fees were triggered mostly by 
changes in the market demand for the franchise rights and by changes in the cost of running 
the system. They attributed adjustments to the royalty rates to changes in the cost of running 
the system, in market demand, and in the value of the trademark. 
Finally, one key theoretical question in franchising involves the link between the franchise 
fee and royalty rate. It has been suggested that these forms of payment can be used in various 
combinations to provide appropriate incentives (Rubin 1978; La1 1990; Bhattacharyya and 
Lafontaine 1992). Assuming that the combinations of franchise fees and royalty rates leave 
franchisees at their reservation utility, as most of the existing agency models imply, the two 
should be negatively correlated. However, in cross-sectional analyses, Lafontaine (1992a,b) 
and Banerji and Simon (1992) did not find this negative correlation. Sen (1993), on the other 
hand, found some support for the notion that factors that affect royalty rates positively 
simultaneously affect franchise fees negatively. Our survey allowed us to extend these 
analyses by examining whether adjustments to the franchise fee and royalty rates are 
negatively correlated. We found that for those franchisers that changed both their franchise 
fees and royalty rates as their system matured, eighty-three percent of the changes were in 
the same direction. More specifically, in all these cases the franchise fees and royalty rates 
were both increased. In 14% of the cases, the royalty rates went down while franchise fees 
went up, and vice versa for the remaining 3% of the cases. One possible reason for the 
strength of the positive relationship found between increases in royalties and franchise fees 
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is the increasing value of the franchise itself. The hypothesized negative correlation holds 
the value of the franchise constant. Here, the passage of time and the growth of the sampled 
systems may be acting to create a dynamic process not modelled in the standard analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
The primary purpose of this study was to gain insight into the evolution of the ownership 
structure of franchised chains. Although longitudinal data were not available for this study, 
the firm-level, primary data reported here is a significant improvement over the industry 
level analyses typical of research in the area (Dant et al. 1992). 
Our results support the notion that resource constraints might play a role in determining 
the extent to which franchisers own outlets. Both the fact that firms tended to increase their 
proportion of company-owned units when they reached about 16 years of age, and the fact 
that franchisers that were subsidiaries of larger corporations owned more of their own units, 
point toward the idea that access to resources might constrain some firms to operate less 
units than they would like. However, it is also clear from the data that the fianchisors in this 
study intend to continue to operate a mix of company-owned and franchised outlets, with the 
sought proportion of company-owned units being relatively small. This later tendency, towards 
a relatively limited use of company-ownership, suggests that franchising is indeed the generally 
preferred mode of operation for these firms, presumably because of its incentive properties. The 
fact that franchisers could identify synergistic effects associated with company-owned units most 
likely explains why they want to own some units despite the better incentive structure achieved 
through franchising. In other words, as heavily franchised systems experience a relaxation of 
their resource constraints and become more able to expand through company-ownership, they 
may do so only to take advantage of the plural form benefits and not at all in an attempt to reach 
the near complete ownership envisioned by Oxenfeldt and Kelly. 
Among the related findings, we found that there is a strong preference for uniformity of 
franchise contracts across all franchisees, and that franchisers negotiate their franchise 
agreements only when compelled to do so. Only about half of the respondents ever agreed 
to negotiate some (almost always non-monetary) aspect of their contract. The newer and 
presumably less powerful franchisers are more likely to engage in this type of negotiation. 
We also found that contract terms do change over the life of the system. Changes in 
franchise fees and royalty rates were driven by both demand and cost changes. The most 
interesting finding regarding the changes in fees and royalties was the fact that they tend to 
increase simultaneously. Although this finding may be due to increases in the value of the 
franchises (an effect for which we did not control), it might also have implications for 
economic theory which strongly suggests the negative interdependence of these fees. 
This paper has begun the process of understanding the dynamics of franchise systems. 
Their evolution, especially as it relates to the change in ownership patterns, is important not 
only to franchising researchers, but also to policy makers, and to franchise managers. The 
current interest in increased franchise legislation is a direct result of presumed changes in 
ownership patterns and the implied opportunistic behavior of franchisers. Time-series, 
firm-level data are critical to the accurate assessment of these phenomena. This study is 
offered as a first step in that direction. 
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NOTES 
1. There have also been a few models based on information asymmetry or “hidden characteristics” 
in the principal-agent literature. See notably Gallini and Lutz (1992). 
2. Franchisers usually start out with some company operated prototypes. Hence these firms are 
100% company-owned when they start franchising. As a result, this proportion (of company-owned 
outlets) can only go down originally. As the system becomes more mature however, according to 
Oxenfeldt and Kelly, we should find that the proportion of company-owned outlets begins to increase. 
3. Incentives for franchisee performance have typically been derived from either residual clai- 
mancy rights or from forfeitable bonds (e.g., Klein 1980, Klein and Saft 1985; Klein and Murphy 
1988). Kaufmann and Lafontaine (1994) make the case that residual claimancy rights and bonds (or 
forfeitable rents) may be used together to create the right set of incentives. 
4. This would especially be the case if all outlets were “similar” in terms of market potential and 
other relevant characteristics. Theoretically, in this case, the optimal solution would be to franchise all 
outlets under the same contract terms. If the outlets were heterogeneous, then all outlets optimally 
would be franchised under different franchise agreements. If however outlets were heterogeneous, and 
the firm could use only one franchise contract, it might find it optimal to operate directly those units 
whose optimal contract would involve a very high royalty rate. 
5. The signaling hypothesis, proposed notably by Gallini and Lutz (1992), also suggests a shift 
toward franchising as a franchise system matures. However, Lafontaine 1992a finds little empirical 
support for this explanation for franchising in her empirical analyses. 
6. Franchising in the Economy was originally published by the Department of Commerce. This 
publication was suspended in 1988 as part of the government’s privatization program. As a result, 
1986 is the last year for which this information is available from the US Government. In 1990, the 
Educational Foundation of the International Franchise Association, in conjunction with Horwath 
International, published a new version of this annual survey. Their results for 1988 were based on 2239 
respondents. 
7. When categories were grouped so that the expected size of each cell was more than five (Kinnear 
and Taylor 1991), the under-representation of restaurants in the sample, and the over-representation 
of respondents in the miscellaneous category, produced a significant Chi-Square overall. How this 
pattern should bias the results is not obvious. 
8. We asked franchisers “Has the proportion of company-owned outlets changed in your firm since 
you first adopted franchising?’ and “If yes, how has it changed?’ Possible answers included: Increased 
Steadily; Decreased Steadily; Went Down then Up; Varied without a Clear Pattern; Other, Please 
Explain. 
9. Only 14 of 130 respondent franchisers indicated that they permitted negotiation of some 
monetary terms, and they did not differ in age from those that did not negotiate. 
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